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Abstract—In 5G networks, the Cloud Radio Access Network
(C-RAN) is considered a promising future architecture in terms
of minimizing energy consumption and allocating resources effi-
ciently by providing real-time cloud infrastructures, cooperative
radio, and centralized data processing. Recently, given their vul-
nerability to malicious attacks, the security of C-RAN networks
has attracted significant attention. Among various anomaly-based
intrusion detection techniques, the most promising one is the
machine learning-based intrusion detection as it learns without
human assistance and adjusts actions accordingly. In this direc-
tion, many solutions have been proposed, but they show either low
accuracy in terms of attack classification or they offer just a single
layer of attack detection. This research focuses on deploying a
multi-stage machine learning-based intrusion detection (ML-IDS)
in 5G C-RAN that can detect and classify four types of jamming
attacks: constant jamming, random jamming, deceptive jamming,
and reactive jamming. This deployment enhances security by
minimizing the false negatives in C-RAN architectures. The
experimental evaluation of the proposed solution is carried out
using WSN-DS (Wireless Sensor Networks DataSet), which is
a dedicated wireless dataset for intrusion detection. The final
classification accuracy of attacks is 94.51% with a 7.84% false
negative rate.
Index terms— Cloud Radio Access Network, Jamming
attacks, Machine Learning-based Intrusion Detection System,
Multilayer Perceptron, Support Vector Machine, Wireless Sen-
sor Networks DataSet.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, with the strong growth in the number
of customers, the consumption of data traffic from wireless
terminals has drastically increased [1-4]. Moreover, according
to a study conducted by the ”Beijing Key Laboratory of
Network System Architecture and Convergence, China” on
mobile Internet penetration in the world from 2013 to 2019 [1],
48.8% of the world’s mobile phones had access to the Internet
in 2014. This figure reached 61.2% in 2018, with an average
annual increase of 8.3% in the number of mobile devices. In
this context, due to the shortage of spectrum and bandwidth,
traditional RANs are not able to meet the growing demands
of mobile users. Cloud Radio Access Network (C-RANs) ar-
chitectures present a promising solution to potentially increase
the network flexibility and improve its performance, possibly
overcoming the problems of traditional RANs [3]. In fact, real-
time cloud infrastructures, cooperative radio, centralized data
processing, and cloud radio access networks are increasingly
sought by mobile operators to meet the requirements of end-
users. Since IBM defined the concept of C-RAN in 2010, this
technology has attracted significant attention around the world.
The fifth generation of mobile technologies (5G) established
C-RAN as its architecture to support their new mobile services
and communications [4].
A C-RAN network, which has a mesh topology, is com-
posed of three main components: Virtualized Base-Band Unit
(BBU) pool, Remote Radio Head (RRH), and a fronthaul
network connecting the RRHs to the BBU pool. RRHs collect
wireless signals from all wireless devices and the fronthaul
network sends them to the BBU pool. Thanks to a Digital
Signal Processor (DSP) controller in the BBU pool, the C-
RAN network can re-assign the fronthaul network to meet the
changing traffic needs of mobile devices [5].
Recently, because of their vulnerability to malicious attacks,
the security of C-RAN networks has drawn special attention
and concern [6]. Due to the open nature of wireless networks,
both authorized and illegitimate users can access the commu-
nication channel. Thus, C-RANs inherit all the attacks that
can be performed on wireless networks, including the most
popular jamming attacks. Due to their ability to easily disable
radio channels that use strong high-level security measures,
jamming attacks represent the most serious security threat
in the wireless communication field. Several forms of this
attack can be used against C-RAN, namely constant jamming,
random jamming, deceptive jamming, and reactive jamming
[7].
In this context, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) have been
developed to enhance the security of the network. Signature-
based intrusion detection (S-IDS) is a valuable technology
which could protect C-RAN networks against the known
attacks. However, this method fails to identify new attacks
[8]. On the other hand, anomaly-based intrusion detection (A-
IDS) can resolve this limitation by detecting unknown or novel
attacks. Among various anomaly-based intrusion detection
techniques, machine learning-based intrusion detection (ML-
IDS) shows great potential. In this direction, different solutions
have been proposed to tackle security threats.
Syed et al. [9] proposed a new radio modulation network-
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based intrusion detection system for jamming attacks named
LIDS. They implemented two LIDS algorithms based on the
Kullback Leibler Divergence (KLD) and Hamming distance
(HD). The detection rates achieved are of 98% and 88%,
respectively with a 5% false positive rate. Imen et al. [10] de-
signed an intrusion detection mechanism to limit DoS attacks
in Wireless Sensor Networks. They implemented five machine
learning algorithms to detect and classify DoS attacks. Oscar et
al. [11] presented a machine learning-based jamming detection
approach capable of detecting constant and reactive jammers
under various scenarios in 802.11 networks. Yi et al. [12]
presented a machine learning method for launching jamming
attacks in wireless communications and also introduced a
defense strategy. For vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs).
Dimitrios et al. [13] presented a method for detecting and
clustering radio frequency (RF) jamming attacks based on the
use of unsupervised machine learning. Thi et al. [14] designed
a machine learning based IDS to classify four DoS attacks in
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN).
This work aims to deploy a new multi-stage ML-IDS
with a double detection check against jamming attacks which
ensures a high attack detection accuracy. Precisely, our main
contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a new ML-IDS concept based on supervised
and deep learning for the detection and classification of
jamming attacks.
• We enhance the security of C-RAN networks by deploy-
ing a high accuracy multi-stage jamming attack detection
mechanism.
• We implement our final solution into the BBU pool
without greatly affecting the latency.
II. TYPES OF JAMMERS AND INTRUSION DETECTION
SYSTEMS
In this section we will go through the existing types of
jammers then we will justify the chosen detection method.
A. Types Of Jammers
A jammer is an equipment that can disturb a node’s signal
by increasing its power spectral density (PSD). There are
several types of jammers that may be used against C-RAN
networks, namely: constant jammer, random jammer, decep-
tive jammer, and reactive jammer.
1) Constant jammer: a constant jammer continuously pro-
duces radio signals completely random. They do not follow
any underlying MAC protocol and are only random bits.
2) Random jammer: a random jammer works randomly in
two states; sleep and jamming. During the sleep state, it is idle
and during the jamming state, it acts as a constant jammer.
3) Deceptive jammer: as deceptive jammer is a constant
jammer that continuously transmits regular packets. It is
more difficult to detect because it transmits legitimate packets
instead of random bits.
4) Reactive jammer: a reactive or intelligent jammer is
activated when it detects a transmission on the channel and
starts sending illegitimate packets. If the channel is inactive,
it stays inactive and continues sensing the channel.
B. The Chosen Detection Method
IDSs are strategically placed on a network to detect threats
and monitor network traffic. IDS uses network or host-based
approaches to recognize attacks by collecting data from net-
work systems and sources and analyzing it to identify potential
threats.
As we can see in Figure 1, there are several intrusion
detection methods, the most popular being signature-based.
Signature-based detection is governed by a set of rules used to
match models in network traffic. It detects well-known attacks;
however, it has a major drawback since it is incapable of
identifying new attacks. On the other hand, anomaly based-
IDS detect unknown or novel attacks. Anomaly-based IDS
detect attacks that have not been dealt with before.
Fig. 1: Hierarchical Classification of IDS [8].
Among the various anomaly based-IDS techniques such as
Machine Learning based IDS (ML-IDS), Knowledge Based
IDS (K-IDS), Data Mining based IDS (DM-IDS), Statistical
Anomaly based IDS (SA-IDS), the most promising one is ML-
IDS since it is capable of gradually improving its performance
by learning over time while performing a given task.
III. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL
This section presents the proposed system model by first
exhibiting the architecture deployed and then justifying the
chosen implemented classifiers.
A. The Deployment Architecture
The deployed architecture of the proposed ML-IDS in C-
RAN architecture is shown in Figure 2 with its mesh topology
using Low Energy Aware Cluster Hierarchy (LEACH) routing
protocol. LEACH is an adaptive and self-organized clustering
protocol in WSNs that is characterized by its simplicity and
low energy. LEACH assumes that the base station (BS) is fixed
and located far from the sensor nodes. The main idea of the
LEACH protocol is to arrange nodes into clusters to distribute
energy among all nodes in the network. In addition, in each
cluster there is a Cluster Head (CH) node that collects the
data received from the sensors in its cluster and transmits it to
the BS. At the BSs we have a number of antennas distributed
geographically to provide higher coverage.
Each antenna is connected with a Remote Radio Head
(RRH) through a coaxial cable, and every RRH is connected
to a Base Band Unit (BBU) pool via an optical fiber which has
a very low loss. The Fronthaul is the part between the RRHs
and the BBU pool which is the physical section while the part
between the BBU pool and the mobile core network (internet,
cloud computing resources ...) is called Backhaul which is the
virtual section of the network.
Fig. 2: Architecture for deploying the proposed ML-IDS in
C-RAN environments.
The proposed ML-IDS collects mobile traffic flowing be-
tween the clusters and the FrontHaul, and processes it with
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP). Our model classifies traffic
into five classes, namely constant jamming, random jamming,
deceptive jamming, reactive jamming, and normal traffic. If
classified as normal by MLP, the traffic is processed again by a
Kernelized Support Vector Machine (KSVM). The motivation
to add a KSVM after the MLP is to reduce the false negatives
that the MLP has created. In a false negative, the system
decides that the situation is normal while in reality there is
an attack.
The ML-IDS is deployed into the virtualized BBU pool for
several reasons. First, the virtualized BBU pool contains all
the functionalities of the C-RAN network such as spectrum
allocation, confidential user data, network slicing, cloud ser-
vices management, etc. Thus, the BBU pool controls the entire
C-RAN network. Second, the objective of a jamming attack
is to add noise in the area between clusters and BSs where
the BBU pool is the only part of the C-RAN that monitors
this area. And finally, the BBU pool is the infrastructure that
contains enough resources to run such a detection engine
without greatly affecting the latency.
B. The Implemented Classifiers
Two classifiers have been implemented in the BBU Pool
to detect the aforementioned four types of jamming attacks.
Therefore, if an attack is missed with the first classifier the
second one will be able to detect it. The first classifier is MLP
which is a deep learning algorithm. MLP consists of a system
of interconnected neurons as shown in Figure 3, which is a
model representing a non-linear mapping between input and
output vectors.
Fig. 3: A multilayer perceptron with several hidden layers
[15].
MLP has been chosen because of the very large number
of input vectors (we have 374661 vectors in our case) so the
stochastic gradient drop is often the best choice (especially
for classification) in terms of speed, ability, and control. MLP
was chosen among all deep learning algorithms (CNN, RNN,
LSTM, DBM...) because of its flexibility which allows it to
be applied to different types of data.
The second algorithm implemented is the KSVM which is
an efficient binary classifier. Knowing that jamming attacks are
not linearly separable in a low dimension space, the KSVM
handles such situations when using a kernel function. This
function maps the data in a different space where a linear
hyperplane can be used to split the attacks. The process is
illustrated in Figure 4. This is called the kernel trick as the
kernel function transforms the data into a higher dimensional
feature space so that a linear separation is possible.
Fig. 4: Non-linear classifier using Kernel trick [16].
The decision limit or so-called hyperplane separating the
classes has weighting coefficients given by the vector W, which
we need to estimate. The KSVM classifier tries to maximize
the distance between this vector W and the nearest points
(support vectors) so that it becomes our constraint. This is
equivalent to minimizing the following equation:
W (α) = −
l∑
i=1
αi +
1
2
l∑
i=1
l∑
j=1
yiyjαiαjxixj
Subject to:
l∑
i=1
yiαi = 0
Where l is the number of data points in our training data,
y denote the outputs of the data points, x is the feature vector
in each training example, and α is the Lagrangian constant.
IV. WSN-DS DESCRIPTION
To obtain experimental results, the WSN-DS, which is a
specialized dataset for WSNs was used to classify attacks,
which is a dedicated wireless dataset for intrusion detection
[9]. It contains exactly 374,661 simple connection vectors,
each of which includes 23 features and is labeled as normal
or attack. The specific types of attacks are grouped into
different categories of attacks, namely Constant jamming,
Random jamming, Deceptive jamming, and Reactive jamming,
in addition to the normal case (without attack).
The WSN-DS contains 23 attributes (features) to help
determine the state of every node in the C-RAN network.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique
primarily used for dimensionality reduction which consists of
selecting the attributes that contain the maximum amount of
information in the order of importance, to have a model that
is easier to interpret and that reduces the calculation time
required. As we can see in Figure 5, we were able to extract
the most important features from the 23, and these selected
attributes are listed as follows:
• Energy consumption: the amount of energy consumed
in the previous round.
At first, each node generates an arbitrary number between
0 and 1, then a threshold is computed T(n) using the
formula below. If the chosen random number is less than
the threshold value, the node will become a Cluster Head
(CH).
T (n) =
{
p
1−p×(r mod p−1) ∀n ∈ N
0 otherwise
where p is the CH probability, N is the set of nodes that
have not been a CH in the last 1/p rounds, and r is the
current round.
• Is CH: A flag to distinguish whether the node is a CH
(value 1) or a normal node (value 0).
• ADV CH send: the number of advertise CH broadcast
messages sent to the nodes.
• ADV SCH send: the number of advertise TDMA sched-
ule broadcast messages sent to the nodes.
• Data sent to BS: the amount of packets of data trans-
mitted to the RRH.
• Distance CH to BS: the distance between the CH and
the RRH.
• Data received: the number of packets received from CHs.
• ADV CH receives: the number of advertise CH messages
received from CHs.
• Join REQ receive: the number of join request messages
received by the CHs from the nodes.
• Time: the current simulation time of the node.
Fig. 5: Top 10 most important features in WSN-DS.
The WSN-DS was separated into 70% training data and
30% testing data. Table I shows the data separation.
TABLE I: Number of records used in training and testing datasets.
Class Number of records used in dataset
Training set (70%) Testing set (30%)
Normal 238103 101963
Constant jamming 10233 4363
Random jamming 6960 3089
Deceptive jamming 4650 1988
Reactive jamming 2316 996
Sum 262262 112399
V. EXPERIMENTATION RESULTS
The results obtained from the dataset are presented in
this section. All the tasks are performed using the Python
programming language and Scikit-learn library. Experiments
were conducted on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v5,
16.00 GB RAM with Windows 10 Enterprise 2016 LTSB 64-
bit Operating System, and x64-Based Processor. Table II show
the classification accuracy obtained for each stage.
TABLE II: Classification accuracy for each stage.
Method used Accuracy
MLP (first stage) 81,73 %
MLP + KSVM (second stage) 94,51 %
To evaluate the proposed approach, We compared our multi-
stage model with another work that used just MLP [10] applied
to the same dataset to confirm that our approach is the most
appropriate. Table III illustrates that our model can provide
better accuracy of attacks classification than just the MLP
model.
TABLE III: Global and classes accuracies.
Model Accuracy of attacks classification GlobalAcc
Rando. Const. React. Decept. Norm.
MLP [10] 92.8% 75.6% 99.4% 92.2% 99.8% 91.9%
MLP +
KSVM 95.3% 82.9% 99.6% 94.7% 100% 94.5%
Moreover, Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
is used to visualise the performance of the classifiers. It gives
us the trade-off between the True Positive Rate (TPR) and the
False Positive Rate (FPR) at different classification thresholds.
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
FPR =
FP
TN + FP
As shown in the equations above, TPR is the proportion
of observations that are correctly predicted to be positive.
However, FPR is the proportion of observations that are
incorrectly predicted to be positive. Figure 6 shows the ROC
curve for each model.
Fig. 6: Receiver operating characteristic curve.
These results showed that the application of MLP and
KSVM to WSN-DS dataset provides a higher classification
accuracy and better security in C-RAN architectures.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In the present paper, we proposed an efficient multi-stage
solution that can detect four different types of jamming attacks
in Cloud Radio Access Networks (C-RAN) by deploying a
new machine learning-based intrusion detection system (ML-
IDS). We have implemented a multi-stage detection based on
supervised and deep learning classifiers to reduce the number
of attacks missed and to decrease the system’s false negatives
and false positives rates. The proposed solution guarantees a
high detection and classification accuracy that can reach up to
94%. In the future, we aim to create our wireless dataset for
intrusion detection to include other types of jamming attacks
such as shot noise-based intelligent jamming. In addition, sev-
eral attacks that target C-RAN architectures like eavesdropping
attacks, primary user emulation attacks, and impersonation
attacks will be included.
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